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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
COX, JEFFERY J. and ELLIOTT J. 
a co-partnership, ELLIOTT J. 
COX, JEFFERY J. COX, YVONNE 
COX, BLANCHE COX, UNITED 
STATES OF ~RICA, TRACY-COLLINS 
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, BANK OF 
EPHRAIM, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
- - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - ~ -
Case No. ~/(93-8-S-
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS COX 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants-Respondents Cox do not agree with the 
statement of facts set forth in the brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant and therefore, set forth the following statement 
of facts. 
Utah Farm Production Credit Association (hereinafter 
PCA) finances the turkey business of certain turkey growers in 
Sanpete County (Findings of Fact 15). At the times relevant 
hereto Jeffery J. Cox was in the business of raising turkeys 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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in Sanpete county, Utah, and was one of the growers financed 
by PCA. 
In. February of 1973, Jeff Cox (hereinafter Cox) 
opened a line of credit with PCA which continued through 
· 1975 (Tr. 25, 329). During this period his indebtedness 
increased, and each year PCA renewed his loan for a year and 
financed his operation for the following year (Tr. 4 7) . Jeffe 
Cox and his wife Yvonne signed promissory notes and security 
agreements in favor of PCA as did his parents Elliott and 
Blanche Cox. In the fall of 1976 Jeff Cox evaluated his debt 
with PCA and decided to withdraw from the turkey growing 
business and put his farm and "retains 11 from Moroni 
Feed Company up for sale to pay off his. debt with PCA. 
When Cox informed PCA of his intent to get out of 
the business of raising turkeys, PCA felt that it was under-
collateralized on its loan to Cox (Tr. 216-220, 247-250). In 
an attempt to improve its security margin s tephen L. Adamson, 
a PCA loan officer, met with Jeff Cox on January 17, 1977. 
At this meeting, Adamson said PCA would be willing to finance 
Cox' turkey business for another year ( 1977) if Cox would agree 
to pledge his stock in Moroni Coal Company as security (Find-
ings of Fact 17). Cox agreed, but stated that his father who 
held a controlling interest in the coal company would not 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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pledge his stock. Adamson authorized Cox to purchase 60,000 
turkey poults and released Cox' 1977 "retains" (dividends pay-
able from Moroni Feed Company and which were covered by a 
security agreement in favor of PCA) toward the delivery of the 
first 20,000 poults (Findings of Fact 17, 19). Also, based 
on PCA's loan commitment, Cox took his farm and Moroni Feed 
Company dividends off the market (Findings of Fact 19). 
PCA's course of dealing and performance was such 
that Adamson had apparent and express authority to make a loan 
cormnitment to Cox (Findings of Fact 16, 18; Tr. 118). 
At a second meeting, approximately one week later, 
Cox delivered his Moroni Coal Company Stock to PCA and Adamson 
drafted a budget with Cox covering operating expenses for 
the year (Tr. 96, Defs'. Exh. 30). It was agreed that these 
expenses were to be covered by a loan that would be due one 
year from the day the promissory note was to be signed (Tr. 271 
A, 127, 128). The possibility of obtaining a government 
guaranteed loan covering the outstanding debt to date was 
also discussed (Tr. 271 and 271A). Government guaranteed 
loans had not been available in the past (Tr. 170-171). 
On February 12, 1977, Cox took delivery of the first 
20,000 turkeys (Tr. 98). Cox repeatedly called PCA about 
receiving the loan proceeds and was repeatedly put off (Tr. 
100, 101). Finally, at PCA's suggestion, Cox took out a per-
sonal loan with the Bank of Ephraim for $2,500 to pay some 
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of his current turkey expenses (Tr. 101, 102). He still 
owed Moroni Feed Company about $34,000 for turkey poults and 
feed (Tr. 106). 
Approximately seven weeks following the delivery 
of the first brood of turkeys, PCA again met with Defendants 
(Tr. 104). At this meeting PCA added a new demand requiring 
that in addition to Jeff Cox' stock, Elliot Cox' stock in 
Moroni Coal Company would also be. required as additional 
collateral on the loan {Tr. 102-106, 254, 258). As he had 
done in the past, Elliot Cox refused; whereupon PCA retracted 
their conunitment on the loan and said it would immediately 
foreclose on Defendant's security including the turkey farm 
(Findings of Fact 21 Tr. 105). Having no way to forestall the 
imminent foreclosure action, Cox sold the 20,000 turkeys and 
went to work as a truck driver at Moroni Coal Company {Findings 
of Fact 22, Tr. 138-140). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court 
entered judgment in favor of PCA with an offset representing 
Cox' loss of profits suffered from the recision of PCA's loan 
commitment {Tr. 332) • In computing the amount of the offset 
the court considered the average profit per pound made by 
growers participating in the Moroni Feed Company cooperative 
program which was four cents per pound for the year 1977. 
(Tr. 199-200). The final production poundage of Cox' first 
brood of 20,000 turkeys {which had been sold to one of the 
Moroni Feed Company growers) was 321,560 Pounds (Tr. 191). 
The court tripled this poundage 0 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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turkeys which would have been raised and at four cents a pound 
found Cox' profit to be $38,587.20. The court then added 
"retains 11 at six cents a pound which were to be retained by 
the cooperative and paid in five years and reduced this figure 
to present value -- ($28,940.40) to find a gross lost profit 
figure of $57,527.60. From this figure the court subtracted 
certain sums for expenses which were saved by Cox because he 
was out of the turkey business and the wages Jeff Cox was able 
to earn as a truck driver to find a net lost profit total of 
$40,927.60. Finally, the Court added $4,000.00 as an offset 
against the interest Cox had been charged by PCA on the $40,927 .60 
which PCA was not entitled to recover and found Cox' total offset 
to be $44,927.60 (Findings of Fact 23-28, Tr. 330-332). 
A profit of four cents per pound was conservative 
because the evidence showed that for the type of turkeys Cox 
had the profit would have probably been greater (Tr. 202, 204). 
Moreover, it was shown that to use the first 20,000 brood of 
turkeys to estimate the poundage for the entire year was also 
conservative because the first brood is the least productive 
(Tr. 327). The trial court reduced the offset by the amount 
Cox made as a truck driver after the turkeys had been sold 
(Tr. 331). This was conservative because in past years he 
had been paid nearly the same amount by the coal company 
while spending nearly full time with the turkey operation. 
(Tr. 141) . 
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POINT I 
DEFENDANTS PROPERLY MITIGATED THEIR 
DAMAGES 
PCA relies upon the general rule of determining 
damages for a breach of contract to lend money, i.e., the 
difference between the cost of borrowing money from the Defen-
dant as opposed to the cost from an alternative source. Appel-
lant has conceded, however, that the rule is not absolute (Appt' 
Brief, 7). Virtually all the authorities recognize the need 
for an alternate form of damages when the borrower is unable 
to mitigate by obtaining alternative financing and suffers 
unavoidable harm. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §343 
(1932); Williston On Contracts §1411, at 614 (1968); 22 Am.Jur. 
2d Damages §69 (1965). In such situations the courts have 
awarded special damages. ~Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 
N.M. 170, 429 P.2d 368 (1967); Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58, 
120 P.2d 611 (1941); 36 A.L.R. 1409 at 1414-1426. 
For example in Cox Corp. v. Dugger, 583 P.2d 96 
(Ut. 1978)!/ plaintiff sought damages for breach of an oral 
contract to lend money. The trial court awarded plaintiff 
damages in the amount of the promised loan. In reversing the 
lower court on other grounds the Court stated that damages, if 
allowable, would not be the amount of the loan as granted by 
the trial court but rather "the difference between the reason-
able value of the property and the amount of money required 
l/There is no connection between the parties or events in Co~ 
Corp. v. Dugger and the parties o:: -,~,,,~"~n= c-n Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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to be paid by the option contract." Cox v. Dugger, supra, 
at 96. In Cox Corp. v. Dugger, Justice Maughan dissented, 
stating that the trial court should not be reversed. 
Nevertheless he agreed with the majority as to the measure 
of damages: 
.•. where the borrower is unable to obtain money 
elsewhere, and the defendant knew of the parti-
cular purpose for which the money was needed, 
special damages may be recovered, provided they 
are not speculative or remote. Cox, supra at 
100. -
It is apparent from Cox that Utah Follows the rule 
to the effect that if the borrower is unable to obtain alter-
native financing, if the lender knew of the purpose for which 
the money was being borrowed, and the damages are not specu-
lative or remote, special damages may be awarded. Defendants 
Cox have met all of these criteria in the instant case. 
A. Defendants Cox were unable to borrow money 
elsewhere. 
The evidence disclosed there were two sources of 
financing available to finance current turkey raising opera-
t~ tions in the Moroni area. Moroni Feed Company and PCA. 
Appellant briefly argues that Cox made no effort to obtain 
alternate financing even though he could have received financ-
ei ing from the Moroni Feed Company for 1977." (Appt' s Brief, 
a: 7) . In so arguing, Appellant ignores certain facts central 
- to Cox' decision to sell the initial 20,000 turkey poults and 
t~ arrange not to take deli very of the remaining 4 0, 0 0 0 . At 
D; Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the time PCA refused to honor its commitment to finance the 
raising of 60,000 poults, Defendants Cox owed over $150,000.oo 
for past years. At the meeting where PCA announced that it 
would not honor its loan commitment, Jeff and Elliott Cox 
were told that PCA would take immediate steps to foreclose 
on the Cox properties (Tr. 105). Among these properties was 
Cox' turkey farm. Cox understood the futility of trying to 
finance the 1977 turkey operation through Moroni Feed Company 
if there was no place to raise them. In fact·, Cox testified 
of an offer by Moroni Feed Company to finance the 1977 operatic 
following PCA's breach. But Cox replied: 
Well that'd be fine by me but Utah Farm Pro-
duction, Vaughn Mills said he would be down here 
with his foreclosure in a week and-a-half and 
I'll have no place to run them [the turkeys] . 
... I don't have any alternative but to get rid 
of them. (Tr. 106) • 
Following PCA' s announcement that it would immediate 
foreclose, Cox was fortunate enough to find a third person to 
purchase the 20,000 turkeys and obtain a release on his commit 
ment to take 40, 000 more turkey poul ts thereby minimizing his 
damages. If he had waited for alternate financing on the 
delinquent past due balance for even a week these arrangements 
may not have been possible. Moreover, the reason PCA was 
foreclosing was due to Cox' difficult financial situation. 
It is doubtful, therefore, that such a delay would have been 
justified in light of poor prospects in obtaining such a large 
loan. 
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PCA's threat to Cox of immediate foreclosure made 
it foolhardy to remain in the turkey business having incurred 
the expense of 20,000 poults and an obligation to take 40,000 
more. The total budget for the 1977 operation had been 
estimated at $368,000.00 (Exh. 30, page 1). Because Cox had 
already incurred approximately $34,000.00 of indebtedness to 
Moroni Feed Company, by selling out when he did, Cox reduced 
his his potential damages by this amount plus any additional 
amounts incurred for additional feed and poults. PCA's only 
suggestion was to let the poults die (Tr. 105). 
B. PCA knew of th~ purpose of the 1977 Cox financing 
and the damages could have been contemplated. 
The second requirement for an award of lost profits 
in the case of a breach of a loan commitment is that the 
breaching party "must know of the particular purpose for which 
the money was needed." Cox Corp. v. Dugger, supra at 100. 
See also, Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 
620 (Utah 1979). Obviously the parties herein knew of the 
particular purposes for which the money was needed (Tr. 93-100, 
225-22 7) . 
I~ Both parties contemplated the expectation of a profit 
in Cox's operation in at least the amount of the damages awarded 
1i, by the lower court. Appellant argues that PCA expected Cox to 
only break even - - that no profit was expected at all during 
:, 1977 (Appt' s Brief, 11) . In fact, PCA and Cox did sit down 
and together calculate Cox' expected profits for 1977 during 
the January 7, 1977 meeting (T'r. 224-227) • In that meeting, Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Fu ding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library S rvices 
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Steve Adamson for PCA filled out a form detailing estimated 
operat±on expenses and a second form detaili?g the estimated 
gross profit from Cox' operation (Defs' Exh. 30, pp. 1 and 4). 
Expenses were estimated at $368,100 and gross profits at 
$471,648 -- a difference or net profit of $103,548. 
PCA's position that no profit was expected is 
apparently based upon Mr. Adamson's testimony at at a later 
date he privately figured a separate more conservative estimate 
that greatly reduced Cox' expected profits (Tr. 227, Defs' 
Exh. 30, p. 15). However, this was a secondary, unofficial, 
private estimate ~ one obviously not shared, or even known, 
by both parties. Regardless of what Adamson thought later, PCA 
cannot claim that it did not contemplate that Cox would make 
a profit with the help of its financing. 
Moreover, the very nature of the turkey industry 
and PCA's business is based on a,contemplation of profits by 
both parties. The turkey industry is cyclical (Tr. 157). The 
two or three years prior to 1977 had been bad years for turkey 
growers (Tr. 219). PCA was financing many of these growers 
(Tr. 219). It is clear that lending institutions are not in 
the business of foreclosing their client' s property, but rather 
they expect their client will be ultimately successful in his 
venture and be able to repay the loan principal with interest. 
This is the essence of PCA's dealings with Cox. Cox accepted 
the opportunity offered by PCA to go another year with the turke 
business -- both parties expecting the next year to be profitabl 
Thus the possibility of profits were necessarily in the contem-
plation of both parties. 
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C. The contemplated lost profits are neither speculative 
::>r remote. 
Lost profits are a recognized measure of damages in Utah. 
insness v. Conoco Distributors, Inc., 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1979); 
:ox Corp. v. Dugger, 583 P.2d 96 (Utah 1978); Howarth v. Ostergaard, 
)Q Utah 2d 183, 515 P.2d 442 (1973); Gould v. Mountain States 
~elephone and Telegraph Co., 6 U.2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 (1957). 
Cn Winsness v. Conoco Distributors, Inc., supra, for example, 
the Utah Supreme Court expressed its acceptance of lost profits 
as a measure of damages as follows: 
In this case, the evidence as to damages is not so meager 
as to invite sheer speculation; imprecise it is, but counsels' 
arguments, the court's instructions, and the common sense 
of the jury will, no doubt, place the evidence in perspective 
for proper resolution of the damage issue. 593 P.2d at 1306. 
In explanation, the court in Winsness cited Professor Corbin's 
.!discussion on this point as consistent with Utah law . 
. . . There is little that can be regarded as "certain," 
especially with respect to what would have happened if the 
march of events had been other than it in fact has been. 
Neither court nor jury is required to attain "certainty" in 
awarding damages; and this is just as true with respect to 
"value" as with respect to "Profits." Therefore, the term 
"speculative and uncertain profits" is not really a 
classification of profits, but is instead a characterization 
of the evidence that is introduced to prove that they would 
have been made if the defendant had not committed a breach 
of contract. The law requires that this evidence shall not 
be so meager or uncertain as to afford no reasonable basis 
for inference, leaving the damages to be determined by 
sympathy and feelings alone. The amount of evidence required 
and the degree of its strength as a basis of inference varies 
with circumstances. A greater amount and a higher degree 
are required in those cases in which it is usually possible 
to produce it than in cases where it is usually impossible 
or difficult and the defendant had reason to know it .... 
Winsness, supra, at 1306, citing Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 
5, §1022. 
In Utah, therefore, a plaintiff who has proved liability 
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should be compensated so long as the evidence of his damage is 
not so meager or uncertain as to afford no reasonable basis for 
inference. Moreover, on appeal this Court should give great 
weight to the lower court's findings concerning lost profits. 
See Mont.er v. Kratzner' s Specialty Bread Company, 29 Utah 2d 18, 
504 P.2d 40 (1972); Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 
P.2d 176 (1961). 
The trial court in this case found the evidence to 
be sufficient. Respondents Cox submit that the evidence is 
sufficient to support the findings and conclusions below to the 
effect that Cox would have raised 60,000 turkeys and made a 
profit equal to at least 4¢ per pound and retains of 6¢ per 
pound on over 900,000 pounds. (Findings of Fact 20-26, Conclu-
sions of Law 6) . 
I. C. 1. It is reasonably certain that the Respondents 
could have acquired the last. 40,000 poults. 
Respondents introduced testimony from Moroni Feed 
Company that PCA had called the hatchery and was certain 
enough of the delivery of the total 60,000 poults that the 
budget sheets were based on that figure, not just 20,000 poults. 
(Def's Exh. 30) The hatchery manager stated that the 40,000 
poults would have been delivered. (Tr. 175-176). 
No evidence was introduced to the effect that the Moroni Feed 
Company would have been unable to meet its commitment to 
deliver the poults as ordered. The trial court had adequate 
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evidence to reasonably conclude that the remaining 40,000 poults 
would be delivered as ordered. 
I. C. 2. The amount of retains or dividends Cox would 
have received was not speculative. 
Moroni Feed Company is a farmers cooperative on a 
very firm financial standing. As part of its program, it with-
holds a portion.of the proceeds fran the sale of the turkeys and pays it to 
the g:rower five years later. These retains, therefore, represent noney con-
tractually owed the turkey grower by Moroni Feed Company. (Tr. 
155) The testimony at trial made it clear that the receipt of 
these is not speculative. (Tr. 88-90) No evidence was intro-
duced that Moroni Feed Company had ever failed to pay the retains 
in full on the date promised. Therefore, the lower court had 
sufficient reason to find that Moroni Feed Company would pay 
retains or dividends in the instant case. 
The evidence of a 10% per year discount rate for 
these retains was undisputed. PCA presented no evidence that 
the rate was inappropriate to apply in determining present value. 
Jeff Cox had found a buyer willing to purchase his future 
retains at a 10% per year discount just before PCA encouraged him 
to take his farm off the market. (Tr. 88-90) Obviously, those 
in the turkey growing industry believed the 10% rate was appro-
priate. (Tr. 115-117) The lower court acted reasonably in 
applying the 10% discount formula. 
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I. c. 3. The evidence supports Plaintiffs' lost profi~. 
cox was an experienced turkey grower who had been 
in the business for 11 years. (Tr. 152) He had experienced 
growth and profits in his business. (Tr. 152, 15 3) There is 
no evidence that Cox lost money during any year that another 
grower made money. (Some of the losses Cox had incurred were 
from his cattle operations. Tr. 162-166, 219 and 322) 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS' BUSINESS HISTORY DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE AN AWARD OF DAMAGES. 
Appellant argues that the Cox turkey raising opera-
tion·had been unsuccessful and that, therefore, they should be 
denied special damages. (Appts 1 Brief 18) The record, however, 
does not support this contention. There was no evidence as to 
what amount that Cox's turkey operation had lost during the 
previous four years. (Tr. 162-166) The turkey growing business 
is cyclical and, hence, profit cannot be shown every year. (Tr. 
157) If Cox had done poorly during the previous four years, it 
was because the industry did poorly those years. (Tr. 219, 322) 
There is no evidence that other growers made a profit during 
these years. The record indicates that Cox's business had been 
successful in the past. (Tr. 152, 153) PCA offered no credible 
evidence to indicate that the Cox operation would not have 
realized the profits found by the court in 1977. There was no 
dispute but that the profitability of the turkey business is 
cyclical and that 1977 was a profit~bl2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT'S LOAN COMMITMENT IS NOT VOID 
UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
According to the evidence, the loan committed to 
Cox was to be paid back to PCA approximately one year later. 
(Tr. 128, 249, 271 A-271) It is well settled in Utah that if 
performance on an oral contract could be performed within one 
year, the contract is outside the statute of frauds. Christen-
sen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959); see 
Keith Gas Co. 1 Inc. v. Jackson Creek cattle Co. I 91 N.M. 87, 570 P.2d 918 (1977) i 
Howarth v. First National Bank of Anchorage, 540 P.2d 486 
(Alaska 1975), aff'd 551 P.2d 934 (1975); see generally 72 
Am. Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, §9 (1974). Obviously, Respon-
dents could have repaid the loan within one year. Indeed, they 
would have been required to repay the lo.an no later than one 
year after receipt of the money. Even if there was no agreement 
as to the repayment date, the loan still could have been repaid 
within one year. Such oral contracts are not affected by the 
Statute of Frauds. The fact that the parties had discussed a 
government guaranteed loan which would have spread the old 
balance over seven years does not invoke the statute of frauds. 
In the past the loans had been for one year only. (Tr. 26) 
PCA's commitment was not contingent upon obtaining a government 
guaranteed loan. .(Tr. 96) 
Also, the doctrine of promissory estoppel takes 
Appellant's oral commitment outside the Statute of Frauds. See 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-16-
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953); Annot., 
56 A.L.R. 3d 1037, 1050 (1974). Section 217A of the Retate-
ment (2d) of Contracts lists the elements of promissory 
estoppel as follows: (l) a promise; (2) which the promiser 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance on 
the part of the promisee; ( 3) and which does induce such action 
or forebearance, is enforceable notwithstanding the statute of 
frauds; ( 4) if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise. 
The trial court found a promise or commitment on the 
part of Appellant. (Findings of Fact 17) Based on this promise, 
Respondents took -their farm and retains off the market, ordered 
60,000 poults, took delivery of 20,000 poults and started up hls 
turkey operation. (Findings of Fact 19) Appellant knew his 
promise to loan the money induced Respond~nt' s actions. (Find· 
ings of Fact 20) Injustice in this case can be avoided only by 
enforcement of Appellant's commitment. 
Even if the agreement had been for more than one ye 
therefore, Appellant PCA would be estopped from asserting the 
Statute of Frauds as a defense. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S LOAN OFFICER HAD APPARENT 
AUTHORITY TO AUTHORIZE THE LOAN. 
In Malia v. Giles, Utah, 114 P.2d 208 (1941), the 
Utah Supreme Court outlined the law of apparent authority: 
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... Either by action or by inaction where there 
is a duty to act, the principal may create a 
situation the reasonable interpretation of which, 
by a third party with whom the agent is about to 
deal, is such as to lead that third party to 
believe that the agent has authority to deal with 
him as contemplated. Under such· circumstances 
the law will hold the principal responsible to that 
third party for the results of that deal with the 
agent. But the conduct of the principal must be 
such as occurs prior to the deal, and not subse-
quent thereto .... (Emphasis added) Malia v. 
Giles, supra, at 211. 
The Restatement (2d) of Agency, §27, Comment, explains: 
. . . Third persons who are aware of what a continu-
ously employed agent has done are normally entitled 
to believe that he will continue to have such 
authority for at least a limited period in the future, 
and this apparent authority continues until the third 
person has been notified or learns fact which should 
· lead him to believe that the agent is no longer 
authorized. (Emphasis added) 
The trial court's finding that the loan officer had 
apparent authority is supported by the evidence. (Findings of 
Fact 18) First, Cox was not aware that the loan officer had no 
authority to commit the loan. He reasonably thought his commit-
ment was final. (Tr. 117-120) Second, it was Cox's past experi-
ence that the loan officer alone approved the loan. (Tr. 117-
120) Third, PCA was aware of its agents' practices of committ-
ing loans before final approval. (Tr. 252, 308, 322) PCA 
may have informed its agents of a policy against committing 
loans without the loan board's approval, but 
it never gave its customers notice of this procedure. As far as 
Cox was concerned, the loan officer had authority to commit loans. 
Thus, Cox has satisfied the Malia requirements of 
apparent authority. PCA failed to act when it had a duty to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-18-
do so and is, therefore, responsible to Respondents Cox for its 
agent's promise. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY PROVED NET PROFITS 
AS PART OF THEIR DAMAGES. 
PCA claims that in arriving at net profits, Cox 
failed to show how much was realized from the sale of the 20,000 
turkeys, how much was spent on fuel, real estate, taxes, rent 
and interest. (Applt's Brief at 19-20) 
A. Sale of turkeys. 
When the 20,000 turkeys were taken over by Chad 
Blackham, he did so by assuming the poult and feed bill at Moroni 
Feed Company. In addition, Cox received 2 0¢ per poul t for broodin 
(Tr. 107) At this point about 17, 000 to 18, 000 birds had survived. 
(Tr. 107) Cox would have, therefore, received a maximum_ of $3,600.00. 
Some of this money was used to pay the Bank of Ephraim who had 
loaned $2,500.00 toward the turkey operation and the balance was 
applied toward obligations at Moroni Feed Company. (Tr. 107) 
As to the expenses not advanced by Moroni Feed Company, Cox's 
evidence showed these separately. (Tr. 109, 111-112) 
B. Fuel exEense. 
PCA claims that only the fuel expense for heat to 
the turkey poults was included to reach net profits and that 
gasoline for trucks was omitted. (Applt's Brief at 19) This 
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Ldentified the expenses which were advanced by Moroni Feed 
::ompany on its 70-30 financing program. Because the profit of 
~¢ a pound given by the Moroni Feed Company accountant was net 
jf expenses advanced by the cooperative, it was necessary to 
identify these types of expenses so they would not be deducted 
again from the 4¢ per pound figure. In identifying such 
advanced items advanced by the cooperative, Mr. Cox included 
~~! 
"the fuel. And when I say fuel, this would be coal or propane, 
l~I: 
whatever it takes to brood those turkeys. " (Tr. 111) 
~l!( 
PCA claims, therefore, that gasoline for trucks 
was not deducted. What gasoline expense is meant is vague. 
The evidence showed that the turkeys are trucked by the coopera-
tive, not the grower. (Tr. 186) Moreover, the evidence indicates 
u 
that gasoline was advanced by the cooperative through its service 
idr: 
station. (Tr. 107) It would appear, therefore, that truck expense 
H~ 
as used by Mr. Cox refers to the actual expense of owning the 
if ll; 
truck (depreciation) • He would not have been able to save 
h ~ 0 th' is by selling his turkeys. The amount involved in any event 
anci 1 • 
small. Page 10 of Exhibit 30 lists fann, auto and truck l.S 
l~ii $500.00. expense at 
cox
1i c. Real estate taxes and EaJ:ments. 
PCA admits that real estate payments and taxes 
were incurred despite Cox's efforts to minimize his damages. 
·eat n (Applt's Brief at 19) These were obviously fixed expenses. 
:ha: For this reason, the court did not take them into account--ei ther 
~j) for or against either PCA or Cox. Frankly, counsel for Respondents 
ne~; does not tl,nderstand any theory that could have required the trial Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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court to consider these. taxes. for any purpose. 
D. Rent. 
PCA claims that Exhibit 30, page l, shows a projecte~ 
--
expense that was not deducted from Cox's profits to arrive at a net 
figure. (Applt's Brief at 20) This argument. is made in one 
sentence. There was no evidence, however, to establish that 
Cox actually would have incurred this expense in connection 
with his turkey operation had PCA honored its commitment. It 
was, therefore, not proper for the lower court to deduct it. 
PCA has not been prejudiced in any event. The trial 
court did deduct a $500.00 expense in arriving at a net figure. 
(Tr. ·330) In doing so, the court referred td page l of Exhibit 
30. (Id.) On that page there are two $500.00 items listed--one 
for rent, the other for insurance. Cox would have incurred the 
insurance cost on his turkey raising facilities whether he was 
using them or whether they were leased out. (The coops were 
leased out after he sold out and the rental income was deducted 
from his offset. Tr. 331) There was no evidence that Cox was 
able to save the other $500.00 either. Nevertheless, the trial 
court did deduct one $500.00 amount from the offset. 
E. Interest. 
PCA claims that the trial court erred when only a 
$9,000.00 credit was given as a deduction against Cox's offset 
for interest he would have paid if the loan commitment had been 
honored. 
Cox presented evidence at trial to show that PCA's 
own loan officer estimated the interest ,~y~:s;:ek'l~~ f~.'C t'.;:-.~ ., '"'"'"' por· Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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~on of the loan to be $9, 000. 00. (Exh. 30, p. 15) No rebutting 
vidence was furnished by PCA. 
Moreover, the figure PCA has stated to be the amount 
f the loan was $368,100.00. (Applt's Brief at 20) This figure 
s incorrect. PCA's reference to $368,100.00 does not refer to the 
oan . (Tr . 12 4 ) 
Q. (By Mr. Boyce] And it would be a fair state-
ment; would it not, to say that the bottom line on 
that, which in the case is what? 
A. Well, its--
Q. What's tile amount of the bottom line, three 
hundred and seventy-one--
A. $368,100,0..0. 
,.~his figure does not represent the amount of the loan but rather 
i•' 
':he Estimated Operating Expenses. (Exh. 30, p. 1) It was well 
I~ 
~stablished at trial that the cooperative advanced the feed and 
11 
··,ther items. The estimated amount of the feed alone was $288,000.00 
llC': 
·· '(Exh. 3 0, p. 1) Even if this feed were paid for by PCA, it would 
, w~ 
· iot have been paid for until it had been acquired. It would not 
:;:1ave been necessary to acquire most of the feed until late in 
"' 
1977 when all 60,000 turkeys had been obtained and they were of 
i size to require a lot of feed. Thus, most of the loan would 
~lave been for only a fraction of a year. 
~ Had the interest offset been other than $9,000.00, 
i ;1PCA should have presented evidence that its own loan officer's 
estimate of the interest was inaccurate. 
In any event, PCA has suffered no prejudice. First, 
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the court did not take into consideration the fact that the type 
of turkey raised by Cox would have yielded a profit after feed 
and other cooperative advanced expenses were deducted of between 
2¢ and 13¢ more per pound than the 4¢ average. On 900, 000 pounds, 
this would be between $18,000.00 and $117,000.00. (Tr. 200-204) 
second, the trial court added an additional $1,ooo.o' 
worth of expense to be deducted from Cox's offset as miscellaneow 
expense. It is not known whether $1,000.00 in miscellaneous 
expenses would have ever been incurred. 
POINT VI 
ATTORNEYS' FEES CANNOT BE ALLOWED 
Plaintiff raises on appeal the question of attorneys' 
fees. The parties stipulated at trial that counsel for Defendant 
would testify that Plaintiff had incurred $15, 000. 00 as attorneys' 
fees in the prosecution and defense of the case. Plaintiff clai~ 
that its attorneys' fee should be reduced only by the same ratio 
that the counterclaim offsets against the complaint. Thus, Plain· 
tiff argues, it should be awarded $10,988.50. (Defendants did 
not stipulate that $15,000.00 was a reasonable amount). 
In support of its position that the attorneys' fees 
should only be reduced by the same ratio as its judgment bears 
to the offset, Plaintiff cites several cases - none of them from 
Utah. There is a Utah case on point. 
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In Stubbs v. Henunert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977) the 
Utah Supreme Court, in a foreclosure action held that the trial 
court had properly awarded plaintiff its fees for the foreclosure 
(3-3/8 hours) and that because the remainder of the attorney 
time involved defense of the Counterclaim, the lower court had 
correctly ruled that Plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement 
for that portion of the fee. 
Similarly in the instant case, the vast bulk of the 
legal fees would have been incurred with respect to the Counter-
claim. Plaintiff presented no testimony which would enable the 
Court to determine how much time was incurred on the Complaint 
portion of the case. The Court had no choice but to deny 
attorneys' fees. 
Moreover, attorneys' fees are in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. In the instant case, it is evident 
that in all probability, but for Plaintiff's breach, there would 
have been no foreclosure (an interested buyer for Defendants' 
farm had been found). It would be inequitable, therefore, to 
award attorneys' fees to Plaintiff. 
POINT VII 
REBUTAL TO APPELLANT'S CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conclusion portion to its brief con-
tains some new arguments. For this reason the arguments are· 
responded to as follows: 
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1. PCA claims Cox should have sought a loan else-
where in order to minimize his damages despite the fact that 
each day Cox delayed in selling out he would have continued to 
incur very large obligations. (See Exh. 30 page 1) PCA did 
not give Cox this option. He was told he c.ould shut the heat 
off and let the poults die; PCA was foreclosing within a week. 
2. PCA claims that no authority existed to make 
the loan by the loan officer. This argument is inconsistent wi~ 
the course of dealing and course of conduct of the parties. There 
is no evidence that Cox knew or should have known that the loan 
officer was not authorized. On the other hand, the fact that a 
commitment was made is undisputed on appeal. 
3. PCA claims that profits were not contemplated 
by the parties. This is absurd. Both parties knew that the 
purpose of the turkey operation was the expectation of the profit. 
4. PCA claims the agreement was not performable 
within one year, despite the fact that it had previously made 
all of its loans to Cox on a one year renewal. 
5. PCA claims that Cox did not prove he was an 
average grower or that he would have earned an average profit. 
Cox submits that based upon the turkeys he had, he would have 
earned a greater than average profit ~ as much as 2 to 13 cents 
per pound more. 
6. PCA claims that there was no history of profit 
and that damages were speculative. This fails to take into 
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account the fact that Cox had made a profit in some years, but 
that during the time he financed with PCA the market was 
depressed. The offset is not speculative, however, because 
1977 was a very profitable year. 
POINT VII (Continued) 
PCA'S CLAIMED REDUCTIONS 
1. PCA claims the counterclaim should be reduced 
by $800.00 but does not state how it calculated this amount. Cox 
stopped working with the turkeys the first of April, 1977. It 
was not necessary for him to work with the turkeys in December. 
For this reason no living expense was allocated to him as a 
,[1: living expense on the operating expense schedule made out by PCA 
( Exh. 3 0 , p . 1) The first of April was a Friday so Cox would 
ii have started at the Coal Company on Monday April 4. This would 
wi have given Cox 36 work weeks plus three days if holidays were 
101 not considered. The Court found 36 weeks even. There was no 
error in the calculation (36x200 = $7,200.00) 
2. PCA claims the remaining 40,000 poults could 
not have been obtained. There is no evidence to support his 
conclusion. The hatching manager testified as follows: 
Q. Were you able to accommodate Mr. Cox with 
respect to the requests on the initial 20,000? 
A. Yes, we were. 
Q. Would you have been able to accommodate him 
with respect to the remaining 40,000? 
A. Yes, we probably could. 
{'T'r _ ~75-176) • 
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3. PCA claims that the payment of the retains 
dividend by Moroni Feed Company in 1982 would have been uncer-
tain and, therefore, speculative. PCA, however, failed to intro-
duce any evidence to the effect that the cooperative had ever 
failed to timely pay "retains" to a grower during its entire 
history, or to show any other reasonable ground to question pay-
ment. 
4. PCA.claims that all of the expenses were not 
deducted to arrive at a net figure. PCA failed, however, to 
show one single expense which would have been incurred, which 
had not otherwise been deducted or which was not saved when 
Cox mitigated by selling out. 
5. PCA claims that an award of $4,000.00 toward 
the offset as prejudgment interest was improper. This award 
only prevented PCA from charging interest on the amount of the 
offset for the year 1978 - after the 1977 profits would have 
been realized if PCA had honored its commitments. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that PCA breached a commitment to Cox to 
finance his turkey operation for 1977 after inducing him to 
remove his farm properties and Moroni Feed Company retains from 
the market is not disputed on appeal. Appellant PCA should, 
therefore, not be afforded the advantage and benefit of compelling 
Respondents Cox to prove damages beyond a reasonable certainty. 
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Respondents Cox have presented credible evidence to establish 
each element of their damages. Appellant PCA has failed to meet 
its burden of appeal and the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
arl Ja 
NIELSEN, 
Attorne 
Cox 
~J 
c 
NRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
for Defendants-Respondents 
400 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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